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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Glen Jones Ward appeals from the district court's order and judgment granting the State's
motion for summary dismissal, and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. He
contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to proceed pro se because
it was not moot when it was filed, and because a post-conviction petitioner has a right to proceed
prose.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Bonneville County Case No. CR-2013-1329, Mr. Ward was convicted of sexual abuse
of a minor under age sixteen after he pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 ( 1970) and was sentenced to a unified term of eighteen years, with seven years fixed.
(R., pp.16, 35, 396, 400.) He filed a direct appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an
unpublished decision. See State v. Ward, No. 42470, 2015 WL 3939961 (Ct. App. June 26,
2015).
Mr. Ward filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief on July 8, 2016. (R., pp.16-20.)
He alleged: ( 1) he did not act with the requisite criminal intent; (2) there was a due process
violation; and (3) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (R., pp.17, 21.) He also
alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel lied, manipulated
his testimony, and coerced him into pleading guilty. (R., pp.21, 33.) The district court appointed
counsel to represent Mr. Ward, and Neal Randall entered an appearance on Mr. Ward's behalf.
(R., pp.58-60.) The State filed an answer to Mr. Ward's petition, and a motion for summary
dismissal. (R., pp.61-68.)
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Mr. Ward filed, pro se, a motion he captioned as a motion for the appointment of
independent counsel or to compel the performance of current counsel (R., pp.90-93.) Kelly
Mallard then filed a motion to substitute himself as counsel for Mr. Ward. (R., pp.103-04.)
Despite the fact that he was now represented by new counsel, Mr. Ward continued to file
numerous pro se motions and affidavits, which the district court accepted and largely ruled upon.
(Tr., p.19, L.6 - p.20, L.2.) Among others, Mr. Ward filed a pro se motion and affidavit in
support of filing an amended petition for post-conviction relief (R., pp.151-56.) The district
court denied the motion without prejudice, stating Mr. Ward's attorney could file an amended
petition on Mr. Ward's behalf. (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-23; R., pp.157, 270.) Mr. Ward had complained
to the district court about not receiving copies of documents filed in the case, and the district
court reminded Mr. Ward's counsel he was responsible for sending copies to Mr. Ward, and also
said the court would "make sure we send him copies of everything." (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-12.)
As instructed, counsel for Mr. Ward filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief
and affidavit. (R., pp.274-77.) The amended petition asserted the same claims as in the original
petition. (R., pp.275, 396.) The State filed an answer to the amended petition, but relied on the
motion for summary dismissal it previously filed, as the amended petition did not include any
new or different claims. (R., pp.294-97.)
The district court held a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal on
January 24, 2018. (R., pp.298-99.) Mr. Ward appeared telephonically, though it appears he had
trouble hearing the proceedings. (Tr., p.31, L.8, p.37, Ls.15-20, p.44, L.25.) Mr. Ward's counsel
did not zealously represent Mr. Ward at this hearing; instead, he said he was in "a tough
situation" and all but conceded that none of Mr. Ward's arguments had merit. (Tr., p.37, L.22 p.42, L.19.) He relied on one case, but noted the argument made in that case "did not work" and
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concluded by saying he "would leave it to [the court's] wisdom and discretion as to the motion
for summary dismissal." (Tr., p.42, Ls.7-19.) The district court said it would "take the matter
under advisement" so it could review the transcript of the change of plea hearing, and would not
consider the matter "fully submitted" until it had a chance to "review that [transcript]."
(Tr., p.44, L.22 - p.45, L.6.)
On February 26, 2018, before the district court received the transcript of the change of
plea hearing, Mr. Ward submitted a pro se motion to the court "respectfully [invoking] his right
to self-representation." (R., pp.323-25.) He filed a supplemental motion with the district court on
March 30, 2018, asking the court to enter a written order granting or denying his motion to
proceed pro se. (R., pp.366-68.)
The transcript of the change of plea hearing was filed with the district court on
February 28, 2018. (Tr., Index, p.1.) It is not clear from the record when the district court
reviewed the transcript. The district court entered an order on April 11, 2018, denying as moot
Mr. Ward's motion to proceed pro se based upon the court's grant of the State's motion for
summary dismissal. (R., pp.393-95.) The district court entered an order granting the State's
motion for summary dismissal on April 12, 2019. (R., pp.396-420.) Mr. Ward filed, pro se, a
timely notice of appeal on May 8, 2018. (R., pp.437-40.) The district court entered judgment on
September 13, 2018. (R., pp.442-43.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ward's motion to proceed prose?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Ward's Motion To Proceed Pro Se

A.

Introduction
The district court denied as moot Mr. Ward's motion to proceed pro se, even though

Mr. Ward filed his motion before the State's motion for summary dismissal was fully submitted.
The district court abused its discretion in denying the motion because it was not moot when it
was filed, and because a post-conviction petitioner has a right to proceed pro se.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is not a constitutional right, but a

matter left to the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 71 (2003), on

reh 'g, 140 Idaho 73 (2004) (citation omitted).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether the district court rightly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the outer
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable
to specific choices; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Justiciability issues, such as mootness, are freely reviewed." State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8
(2010) (citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its Discretion And Did
Not Reach Its Decision to Deny Mr. Ward's Motion By An Exercise Of Reason Because
Mr. Ward's Motion Was Not Moot
The district denied Mr. Ward's motion to proceed prose because it concluded the motion

was moot. (R., pp.393-95.) The district court apparently believed its decision to grant the State's
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motion for summary dismissal rendered Mr. Ward's motion moot, even though Mr. Ward filed
his motion well before the district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal, and
even before the State's motion for summary dismissal was fully submitted. This was an abuse of
discretion, as Mr. Ward's motion was not moot when it was filed, and a court cannot fail to rule
on a motion for so long that it becomes moot.
The district court held a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal on
January 24, 2018. (R., pp.298-99.) The district court said it would "take the matter under
advisement" so it could review the transcript of Mr. Ward's change of plea hearing, and would
not consider the matter "fully submitted" until it had a chance to "review that [transcript]."
(Tr., p.44, L.22 - p.45, L.6.) On February 26, 2018, Mr. Ward submitted a pro se motion to the
court "respectfully [invoking] his right to self-representation." 1 (R., pp.323-25.) The transcript of
the change of plea hearing was filed with the district court two days later, on February 28, 2018.
(Tr., Index, p.1.) It is not clear from the record when the district court reviewed the transcript. On
March 30, 2018, Mr. Ward filed a supplemental motion asking the district court to enter a written
order granting or denying his motion to proceed pro se. (R., pp.366-68.) On April 11, 2018, the
district court entered an order denying as moot Mr. Ward's motion to proceed prose based upon
the court's grant of the State's motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.393-95.) The district court
granted the State's motion for summary dismissal on April 12, 2019. (R., pp.396-420.)
In the district court's own words, the State's motion for summary dismissal was not fully
submitted until the court had a chance to review the transcript of Mr. Ward's change of plea

1

Mr. Ward mailed his motion from the Idaho State Correctional Institution on February 22,
2018. (R., p.325.) Pursuant to the "mailbox rule," which provides documents are deemed filed by
pro se inmates when the documents are submitted for mailing, the motion was actually filed
February 22, not February 26. See Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 643 (1996) (holding "the
mailbox rule applies for purposes of prose inmates filing petitions for post-conviction relief').
6

hearing, which was not filed until February 28, 2018. It is undisputed that Mr. Ward's motion to
proceed pro se was filed before this date. At the time it was filed, Mr. Ward's motion was not
moot, as it presented a real and substantial controversy that was capable of being resolved by the
court. See Barclay, 149 Idaho at 8 (stating "[a]n issue becomes moot if it does not present a real
and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief') (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Our Supreme Court has explained that "an issue is moot if a favorable judicial decision
would not result in any relief or the party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."
State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). At the time

Mr. Ward filed his motion to proceed pro se, it was not moot, as a favorable judicial decision
would have allowed him to proceed pro, and he certainly had a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome of the motion and the proceeding. The district court cannot render a motion moot by
failing to make a timely ruling on it. The district court thus abused its discretion in denying
Mr. Ward's motion as moot.

D.

The District Court Did Not Act Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its Discretion And Did
Not Reach Its Decision to Deny Mr. Ward's Motion By An Exercise Of Reason Because
A Post-Conviction Petitioner Has A Right To Proceed Pro Se
Although it does not appear the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically addressed whether

a post-conviction petitioner has a right to proceed prose, the Court has recognized a right to selfrepresentation in other civil cases. See Weston v. Gritman Mem 'l Hosp., 99 Idaho 717, 720
(1978) ("We recognize the inherent right of a natural person to represent himself Pro se, but this
right does not extend to representation of other persons or corporations."); see also Idaho State
Bar Ass 'n v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm 'n, 102 Idaho 672, 676 (1981) (same). The reasoning of

these cases should apply equally in the post-conviction context, as "[a] petition for post-
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conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure."
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 24 7, 249 (2009).

Here, the district court accepted Mr. Ward's numerous prose motions and affidavits, and
even copied him on all the court filings, which are typically copied only to counsel. (Tr., p.16,
Ls.9-12, p.19, L.6 - p.20, L.2.) Mr. Ward filed his motion to proceed pro se after the district
court held a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal. Mr. Ward was represented by
counsel at this hearing, but Mr. Ward's counsel did not zealously represent Mr. Ward at this
hearing; instead, he said he was in "a tough situation" and all but conceded that none of
Mr. Ward's arguments had merit. (Tr., p.37, L.22 - p.42, L.19.) He relied on one case, but noted
the argument made in that case "did not work" and concluded by saying he "would leave it to
[the court's] wisdom and discretion as to the motion for summary dismissal." (Tr., p.42, Ls.719.) Mr. Ward had trouble hearing the proceedings over the telephone, and was not given an
opportunity to speak on his own behalf. (Tr., p.31, L.8, p.37, Ls.15-20, p.44, L.25.)
In light of Mr. Ward's active participation in this case, even while represented by
counsel, and considering his attorney's performance at the hearing on the State's motion to
dismiss, the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Ward's motion to proceed prose,
and should have allowed him to exercise his right to self-representation, as he requested.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Ward respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court's judgment, reverse
the district court's order denying his motion to proceed pro se, reverse the district court's order
granting the State's motion for summary dismissal, and remand this case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 21 st day of June, 2019.

/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 st day of June, 2019, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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